- Introduction
- The Threat
- The Hazards
- Fire Safety Regulations and the Risk of FAAS
- Key Considerations
- Step 1: Engage
- Internal Stakeholders
- External Stakeholders
- Emergency Services Engagement
- Step 2: Assess the Risk
- Fire Safety Assessment
- Security Risk Assessment
- Step 3: Plan
- Evacuation Planning
- Assembly Points
- Training and Briefing
- Security Training
- Step 4: Protect
- Fire Protection
- Storage of Combustible Materials
- Storage of Waste
- Vegetation
- Lift and Escalators
- Doors
- Letter Boxes
- Windows
- Floor Coverings
- Building Compartmentation
- Protection of the Fire Safety Systems
- Perimeter Protection and Detection Systems
- Securing Infrastructure Outside the Perimeter
- Security Culture
- Step 5: Respond
- Alarm Management
- Firefighting Plans
- Placement of Firefighting Equipment
- Step 6: Review
- Completing the Tasks
- Readiness Checks
- Review the Risk
Introduction
Intended Audience
In general terms, for the purposes of the National Security Act (2023), sabotage is: ‘activity conducted for, on behalf of, or for the benefit of a foreign power, resulting in damage to property, sites and data affecting the UK’s interests, and national security. This can be done through, but not limited to, the use of cyber actions and physical damage.’1
This document provides guidance about mitigating the risks posed by the use of Fire as an Act of Sabotage (FAAS). It is relevant to all those who are responsible for premises and infrastructure, which may be assessed as being a target of such acts.
It is particularly useful to:
- Building managers and operators
- Those responsible for infrastructure
- Physical Security Managers
- The ‘responsible person’ for fire safety
- Security Risk Assessors
For more information about sabotage mitigations visit the Countering the Threat of Sabotage pages.
This guidance is part of a set of documents that provide guidance as to the use of fire as part of an attack. Guidance is provided elsewhere in relation to Fire as a Weapon (FAW)2. The approach to mitigating the risks of FAAS and FAW are similar and some guidance is shared between both documents. However, each document highlights the particular issues associated with each specific threat.
Although this document focusses on the acts conducted for, on behalf of, or for the benefit of a foreign power we note that the contained guidance may be relevant to others at risk from fire-based attacks from a range of other malicious actors.
Those seeking guidance in relation to mitigating the risk of arson or the setting of other deliberate fires should refer to the guidance provided by the National Fire Chiefs Council.3
1 HMG’s National Security Bill Factsheet. Sabotage for the purposes of the National Security Act is defined in section 12 of the Act. This document should not be read as legal advice on the parameters of that offence
2 Fire as a weapon (FAW) – Guidance on the mitigation of the risks associated with terrorist use of fire as a weapon
3 Arson and deliberate fire reduction position statement - NFCC
The Threat
FAAS is likely to be:
- Intended to stop or disrupt the operation of the site as a result of damage or destruction to the site, its infrastructure or intimidation of those operating at the site.
- Unlikely to be intended to cause death or injury and, therefore, more likely to take place during the silent hours when the site is likely to be empty or sparsely occupied.
- Focused against a predetermined target that has been identified for a specific reason.
- An attack method conducted for, on behalf of, or for the benefit of a hostile state.
The attackers may:
- Conduct hostile reconnaissance online and in person in advance of the attack taking place.
- Have limited training or experience and use materials to start a fire that are readily available (e.g. petrol, a lighter or matches).
- Intend to avoid detection and capture.
- Remain at or return to the scene in order to gather evidence of their actions. This may include taking photographs or filming the scene of the fire or the damage and disruption caused.
FAAS attacks may:
- Be started using:
— an accelerant by pouring a flammable liquid or throwing petrol bombs.
— an incendiary device. - Commonly involve petrol as the accelerant. A little petrol or other accelerant may spread widely and so increase the speed of the fire.
- Involve fires started in more than one location within the same site.
The Hazards
The hazards created by a fire can be described as follows:
FIRE - People targeted may evacuate into danger or become trapped. Both fire and smoke will create a collapsing timeframe for emergency responders to save lives. If a fire takes hold and no suppression systems are in place, both the fire and smoke may cause considerable damage to the site.
SMOKE – Poses a very significant risk to people. Fire produces gases that can cause rapid asphyxiation as well as chemical or thermal irritation. These can very quickly cause a number of effects, which can include: disorientation, sickness, difficulty in breathing and death. Smoke can also obscure vision, hampering evacuation and causing confusion.
SPEED AND SPREAD – Fire and smoke can spread very rapidly and across a wide area and so considerably increasing the size of the area to be contained. Fire and smoke are likely to spread even faster when an accelerant is used in an attack.
Fire Safety Regulations and the Risk of FAAS
Fire safety laws and regulations within Great Britain and Northern Ireland are all based on the principles that:
- The building is designed to support escape and firefighter access. Risk is assessed on the basis that any potential increased risk of a fire starting is mitigated with additional control measures.
- The requirements are based on a single fire which
is likely to spread. - The building designers and the ‘responsible person’ are not required to consider multiple fires being started deliberately and simultaneously.
- There is no requirement to consider:
—Any attempt to intentionally hinder escape or the evacuation of the building.
—Fires starting simultaneously in multiple locations.
—An attempt by third parties to intentionally compromise fire protection measures.
There are variations in fire safety legislation and regulation as a result of devolved powers across the United Kingdom. Those responsible for a site must ensure that their site complies with the laws and regulations that are applicable to their site.
In England and Wales, every business or other non-domestic premises is required to complete a Fire Safety Risk Assessment. There is a requirement for a ‘responsible person’ to ensure it is completed and the necessary mitigations are introduced. They may either undertake the risk assessment themselves or seek the support of a Fire Risk Assessor. The fire risk assessment should consider areas of the business/ premises that may be vulnerable to FAAS, i.e. the storage of combustible materials close to buildings or external areas.
Detailed additional information is available from the Home Office and the National Fire Chiefs Council (NFCC) in relation to all aspects of fire safety in the workplace.
Key Considerations
The starting point for every site is to:
- Assess how the threat and risk of a FAAS attack is likely to be manifested
- Decide if the current mitigations are sufficient
- Identify the additional mitigations that should be implemented.
Through analysis of previous attacks and simulations of such attacks, NPSA has been able to identify a series of points that should be considered as part of the site safety and security planning.
Six steps have been identified, under which a series of questions are posed, that should be considered when deciding how to adapt and improve a site’s fire and security plans. The measures taken at each site will be different, and not every point will be applicable to all sites.
These steps are summarised below.
Step 1: Engage
- Have the right stakeholders been engaged?
- Who is responsible for planning and operational decision making?
Internal Stakeholders
As those responsible for site security planning consider the threat of FAAS attacks to their site, they should bring together: the ‘responsible person’, the person completing the Fire Safety Risk Assessment and those responsible for site operations, security, and health and safety functions to support this work.
They will need to work together to identify the most likely threat scenarios for the site or infrastructure and the appropriate mitigation measures. Together, they must ensure that the mitigations integrate into a single plan, intended to prevent, protect and improve the response to an attack in which FAAS is used.
This must include making certain that the right stakeholders work together to deconflict the mitigations identified as a consequence of both the Fire Safety Risk Assessment and the security risk assessment.
External Stakeholders
It is likely that a FAAS will take place when a premises or other infrastructure is either empty, unattended or has few people in it. Therefore, consideration should be given to the level of engagement those responsible for a potential target should have with its neighbours. It may be beneficial to increase their awareness of the risk and encourage them to identify and report any suspicious behaviour that they may spot.
Emergency Services Engagement
The local Fire and Rescue Service (FRS) will have an appointed National Inter-Agency Liaison Officer (NILO) and the local police force will have a Counter Terrorism Security Adviser (CTSA) who may be able to provide guidance in relation to the assessment of risk to the site and the need for additional protective security and fire mitigation measures. Where necessary the NILO may draw upon detailed guidance from the local FRS Fire Safety Inspection Officers.
Step 2: Assess the Risk
- Has an assessment been made of the likely attack methods?
- What level of risk does the site attract from FAAS?
- Is the level of risk acceptable?
- What additional mitigations need to be introduced?
This step is intended to assess the vulnerabilities to FAAS, consider what mitigations might already be in place and whether they are sufficient when considered against the risk appetite for the site, or whether further action is required.
Not every site will need to take further action.
Fire Safety Assessment
When considering FAAS it is important to understand how the risk of fire has already been assessed and the steps taken to mitigate it. Every business or other non-domestic premises is required to complete a Fire Safety Risk Assessment. This will identify the measures needed to reduce the risk of a fire caused by the everyday risks of fire.
A Fire Safety Risk Assessment requires the completion of several steps:
- The identification of the fire hazards that are present at the site.
- The identification of the people at risk who are present at those premises.
- The need to evaluate the risk and decide what mitigation is required.
Consideration should also be given to how a fire would be identified if it takes place whilst the site is both occupied and unoccupied. If the building is unoccupied, the risk to the people is reduced. However, the risk of injury should still be considered. It may also take longer for the fire to be detected, and therefore the resulting damage to the building and its contents may be greater.
Security Risk Assessment
It must be understood that whilst the Fire Safety Risk Assessment is looking to assess fire safety risks that could reasonably occur at any time at a premises, the security risk assessment may identify the need for additional consideration of the risk of FAAS. The Fire Safety Risk Assessment may already include the risk of arson, in which case the mitigation of the risk of FAAS should also be considered.
The security risk assessment may also need to consider items of infrastructure where no Fire Safety Risk Assessment is required as the infrastructure is not contained within a premises.
If it is established that the level of risk of a FAAS requires additional mitigations to be introduced, then detailed consideration should be given as to what these might be. The assessment process and future planning must include the involvement of the appropriate stakeholders. It is essential that those involved in both fire safety and security planning work together.
This will mean that:
- There is a collective understanding of the risk and the need for additional mitigations.
- The effect of the existing fire safety and security measures are understood.
- The impact on critical operations of any premises or infrastructure being damaged or destroyed is understood.
- The additional security mitigations that need to be introduced acknowledge and do not compromise the fire safety measures.
- Any variations to the Fire Safety Risk Assessment and Plan should only be considered when fully understood and agreed by all the relevant stakeholders.
The security risk assessment should include an assessment of the threat to the organisation. This should include an assessment of why the site may be targeted by saboteurs using FAAS as their attack methodology. This may be as a result of the organisation’s position in relation to a cause that the saboteurs, or those on whose behalf they are acting, disagree with. These may include the site undertaking an activity that may be considered to work against the interests of a hostile state or other malicious actors.
As part of the risk assessment, an assessment should be made of the most likely attack points. This should include developing an understanding of how the site or infrastructure is vulnerable to the following:
- Parts of the exterior of a building that are likely to be easily combustible.
- The locations where key infrastructure is most vulnerable.
- Waste products and other items stored outside in skips, bins or just piled up immediately adjacent to a building and readily set alight.
- Materials such as plastics, vegetation, clothing and furniture are readily available at the attack site and can be used as accelerants.
- Storage areas and outbuildings attached to or very close to a building that can be easily accessed and set on fire.
- Letterplates or boxes being used to pour an accelerant through.
- Easily accessible windows that can be smashed and an accelerant thrown or poured through
- External doors that can be forced and a fire started once the attacker is inside.
- Gaps under doors, where a flammable liquid could be poured between the door and the floor.
- Combustible substances stored on site being accessed and used to start the fire.
The risks identified as being unacceptable should now be taken into Step 3 of the planning process.
Step 3: Plan
- What planning should a site go through to implement appropriate and proportionate mitigations?
- How can sites ensure they have effectively adapted and integrated their security and fire safety plans?
- What training and briefing is required to increase awareness of the threat and the part staff can play in preventing and mitigating the impact of FAAS?
This step involves ensuring that all the mitigations that have been identified during the risk assessment process have been implemented or there is a plan to do so.
Evacuation Planning
Any evacuation plan will need to:
- Ensure occupants are aware of the potential for FAAS to impact preplanned evacuation routes due to the locations where fires have been started and how this may compromise fire exits.
- Make sure people are familiar with the escape routes, not just the closest/most convenient to their normal area of work.
Assembly Points
Evacuation planning should review how evacuation assembly points are used. This could be to a number of predetermined assembly points located some distance from the site.
Training and Briefing
A training and briefing plan will be required to make certain that the site occupants are familiar with the response plan that has been developed and that the necessary training is provided to staff undertaking the following roles:
- Fire safety officers
- Fire marshals
- Security officers
- Front of house staff
- Control room staff
Training should include making certain that those staff who may be first to respond understand how they may be able to tackle a fire. They must also understand the limitations of their ability to deal with a fire and when for their own safety, they should leave the fire and evacuate.
This should include training on:
- The use of fire extinguishers, including the most appropriate type of extinguisher for the circumstances. Incorrectly using or selecting the wrong type of extinguisher on a fire where an accelerant has been used, may have a detrimental outcome.
- Using fire blankets
- How a person should respond through smoke, i.e. keep low and cover their mouth with a cloth or towel.
- Stop-drop-roll: a person on fire should, if possible, lie down and roll on the ground. Assistance may be required if the person is incapacitated.
- The emergency services should always be called when a fire is discovered.
Further guidance may be obtained from your local fire and rescue service in relation to the above points.
Personnel need to understand how fast fire and smoke may travel in a normal fire. If an accelerant is used and multiple fires are started simultaneously the fire and smoke will spread faster.
Briefings should be used to inform the broader occupants of the site of the fire procedures. This should be included in the fire safety briefings that should be provided to all new staff. Careful planning will be necessary for sites where there is a high turn-over of staff to make certain that all new arrivals have the relevant briefing.
Security Training
Introduce See Check and Notify4 (SCaN) training to enable all staff to detect and act on suspicious activity. All staff should be regularly reminded as to the steps that they should take to create a hostile environment for an attacker and reduce the opportunities for them. This should include encouraging them to report all incidents that they consider to be suspicious and any incidents of hostile reconnaissance. Incidents should either be reported direct to the police or by informing a supervisor.
Any person witnessing a suspicious incident should make notes of:
- What they saw
- The location
- Time and date of the incident
- The description of any person involved
- The make, model, colour and registration number of any vehicle involved.
Provide staff with feedback, to show that their reports have been taken seriously.
Step 4: Protect
- What additional protective security and fire safety measures could be taken?
- Have all risks been appropriately and proportionately mitigated?
Fire Protection
It is important to understand the level of fire protection that has been designed and built into the construction of a building to protect:
- The building as a whole
- Specifically protected assets
- Refuge points
- Means of escape
- Firefighter access arrangements.
A protected asset may be the storage area for combustible products.
A refuge is a protected area that is a safe place for a disabled person to wait until an evacuation lift or assistance to leave via the stairs is provided. It is important to understand how long the doors and walls in these areas can protect against fire. A means of escape should also be available to enable evacuation away from the protected space should it become compromised.
Additional measures may already be in place or need to be added, which could include:
- Fire detection systems
- Fire alarms
- Sprinklers
- Ventilation
- Firefighting equipment such as fire extinguishers and fire blankets
- Fire Engineered solutions.
Considerations should be given as to the additional measures that may need to be introduced. These may be targeted against specific vulnerabilities that create an unacceptable risk. The solutions introduced may, depending on the nature of the threat and the site, be either temporary or permanent. A temporary solution could be deployed whilst a more complex permanent solution is designed, procured and implemented or if a particular activity is only taking place for a limited period and is identified as being of higher risk and so warrant the implementation of additional temporary measures.
Storage of Combustible Materials
The location, storage and use of combustible items within the site should be considered. They should generally be stored in a safe and secure area. If this is not possible, additional steps should be taken to have them removed or protected. Regular checks should be made to ensure that they have not been tampered with or missing.
Storage of Waste
Careful consideration should be given as to where all waste materials are stored. This should include making certain that:
- Waste is stored in areas where it cannot readily be used as an accelerant. Where necessary, it should be kept in a secure area away from the main site assets.
- Waste should be regularly collected and disposed of.
- Skips should be located away from any asset that could catch fire if a fire was started in it.
- Skips should not be left on site for longer than they are required.
- Consideration should be given to where vehicles are parked. If vehicles are left parked outside overnight, then consideration should be given as to where they are parked. If possible, they should not be parked immediately adjacent to any building. If a vehicle has been abandoned close to any building steps should be taken to have it removed.
Vegetation
Vegetation should not be allowed to grow on or close to any buildings or other assets. This will prevent the vegetation from obscuring visibility or being set alight and allowing a fire to quickly spread to the building or any site assets. The removal of leaves and other dead growth will also prevent it being used as an accelerant.
Lift and Escalators
If a site has lifts and escalators, consideration should be given to how their use may change during an evacuation. Lifts will generally move to the ground floor and escalators will stop during an evacuation.
Doors
NPSA trials have shown that fire rated doors do not normally prevent burning liquid fuel from passing beneath a door, thus potentially compromising the affected room. This can come about either because the liquid can pass:
- Between the floor surface and the bottom of the door
- Or in the case of raised floors, within the void beneath the surface of the raised floor.
Wherever possible, you should try to prevent the flow of fluid passing under the door.
The following mitigations should be considered for situations where the fuel could pass between the floor and the underside of the door:
- Prevent the flow of fluid by checking seals or threshold plates are in place and if not present, where appropriate retrofitted. Ensuring they do not compromise the fire rating or the operation of the door.
- Remove combustible materials (e.g. waste bins) from being adjacent to the door or within the spread of the fuel.
- Fitting a seal or threshold plate.
- Reduce the horizontal spread of the fuel by using e.g. floor coverings/mats that inhibit spread and are also flame retardant. Whilst the flame-retardant material will not fully counteract the full effect of a fire, it will initially slow the rate of spread of the fire. The fire, however, will still need to be extinguished.
- Having the appropriate type of fire extinguisher on hand.
- Design the space to have a secondary means of escape.
In situations involving raised floors, in addition to the above factors consideration should be given to selecting a floor system that will prevent a liquid from passing into the void beneath. Further consideration should be given to limiting combustible materials within the highest risk area – either the floor itself or items located within the void.
It is important to understand the fire ratings of doors and how intumescent strips have been fitted to them. The strips are designed to expand under extreme heat and close off the gap between the door and the frame to prevent the passage of fire and smoke. However, they are typically only installed on the vertical edges of the door and across the top of the door, not along the bottom.
Letter Boxes
Wherever possible, post should be delivered to the premises during working hours. Where this is not feasible, lockable anti-arson letter boxes should be provided that are located outside any building. Sheet metal containers can also be fitted on the inside of letter boxes to contain fires from lighted materials. Some versions are available that incorporate an automatic fire extinguisher.
Unused letter boxes should be permanently sealed.
Consideration should be given as to the procedures that are in place for handling mail received at the site. Detailed information is available on the Screening Mail and Courier Deliveries webpage.
Windows
Buildings with windows that face onto areas that can be easily accessed by the public may be vulnerable to being broken and either having petrol bombs thrown through them or an accelerant poured through them. The risk is likely to be higher if only basic float or annealed glass is used and the window area is large enough to provide an easy target.
Trials showed that glazing of 8mm plus is likely to be resistant to a breach by an incendiary device formed of a glass bottle being thrown against it. In addition, glazing units formed of a pair of 6mm panes (i.e. double glazed) of annealed or toughened glass are likely to be resistant to a single attempt to breach the glass using similar devices.
NPSA do not recommend the use of single panes of 4mm or 6mm annealed or toughened glass. Where this is unavoidable, the use of 175 micron anti-shatter film fitted on the inside face can give good resistance against a single strike from a bottle.
The best level of resistance is achieved by using laminated glass or polycarbonate sheeting. This has the potential to withstand multiple strikes.
Consideration can also be given to how windows can be further protected through the use of bars, grilles and shutters.
Where windows are vulnerable to breaking, the same mitigations as shown above for protecting sites where fuel can be poured under a door should also be considered.
Floor Coverings
Trials involving various floor types have shown that fuel will spread more quickly and widely across smooth, non-absorbent floors, such as tiles, vinyl or laminated floors, than across more absorbent floors such as carpet. In addition, trials indicated that fire-retardant carpet tiles offered a better level of resistance to the flame spreading across the floor.
Building Compartmentation
Where the structure of the building and the nature of its operation permits fire compartmentation may be used to divide a building into separate sections using fire-resistant walls and floors. This design helps to contain a fire within a limited area, slowing its spread and giving people more time to escape safely. It also makes it easier for firefighters to control and extinguish the fire. Additionally, compartmentation helps protect property and valuable items in other parts of the building from being damaged by flames, smoke or heat. Overall, it enhances safety and reduces potential losses in the event of a fire.
Protection of the Fire Safety Systems
Consideration should be given to the vulnerability of fire safety systems being tampered with. This could include understanding how fire alarm (and other equipment) panels can be accessed and how the positioning of firefighting equipment and detection systems may increase their vulnerability to interference or disablement. Regular checks should be made to ensure that fire safety systems have not been tampered with.
Perimeter Protection and Detection Systems
A key part of protecting a site or a building will be to develop an effective perimeter security plan. This should consider how the perimeter is demarcated. Is it demarcated with the building line or is there room to deploy a perimeter security fence? Detailed guidance is available from NPSA as to how a perimeter can be protected. The solution delivered will be informed by the security risk assessment and may include a range of physical (fences, gates, security grilles, etc) technical (CCTV, intruder detection systems, etc) and operational measures (security policies and procedures, security guarding, etc). Detailed guidance is available on the Perimeter webpage.
Securing Infrastructure Outside the Perimeter
Key infrastructure may be located outside a secure perimeter. Consideration should still be given as to how it can be protected through a range of mitigations that may include:
- Building in additional resilience
- Installing CCTV and tamper detection systems
- Introducing additional protective systems
- More frequent patrols by security officers or other personnel.
Security Culture
A key component of the overall security plan that will support the mitigation of the risk of FAAS will be the development of a sound security culture. This culture will encourage every member of staff to play a part in keeping the site safe and secure. This should include simple procedures that become embedded in the site’s workings.
Staff should be trained to follow procedures such as:
During the working day:
- Not letting waste materials build up and are moved regularly from the building
- Ensuring fire doors are not propped open
- Emergency exits are kept clear
- Any tampering with fire safety equipment is reported
- Combustible materials are safely and securely stored
- Any dumped rubbish or abandoned vehicles are investigated.
At the end of the working day:
- Locking all external doors and windows
- Closing all internal doors
- Checking that there are no unauthorised people left on the premises
- Maintaining good housekeeping standards of storage areas and waste containers
- Ensuring that security lighting, alarms and CCTV are switched on and working
- Access to rooftops or scaffolding is restricted to authorised access only.
If a building is to be left unoccupied for an extended period, consideration should be given to turning off the gas supply to the building.
Staff should also report any suspicious activity to the responsible person to alert the relevant authorities.
The awareness of all staff should be raised in relation to the risk from FAAS. This could include briefing them to report any sign of suspicious activity.
This may include:
- The smell of petrol or other accelerants where they are not expected
- Firefighting equipment being moved
- Bottles left in an unusual place
- Other suspicious behaviour.
Step 5: Respond
- Have response plans and standard operating procedures been adapted?
- How do operational decision-makers improve their situational awareness in order to make effective and appropriate decisions?
- Have safety and security response plans been deconflicted?
Alarm Management
If an alarm is activated, operators must understand the protocols for managing that alarm. The ‘responsible person’ for the site can explain the local protocols for responding to alarms. Protocols must support both an occupied and unoccupied building. If an alarm monitoring company is used, then the monitoring company must have 24-hour access to a keyholder who is available to rapidly attend the scene and support the investigation into any alarms.
Firefighting Plans
An Operational Response Plan, a Site Specific Information Pack (SSIP) or Premises / Secure Information Box (PIB/ SIB) may be available at certain sites considered at higher risk of fire incidents. The local FRS will complete them with the help of the site representatives. They will provide the FRS Incident Commander arriving at the scene with a readymade information pack, which should include plans that will provide key information about the site and the identified fire risks. They must be held in a location that is immediately accessible but unlikely to be directly impacted by the most likely fire scenarios.
Placement of Firefighting Equipment
Consideration should be given to the selection and positioning of fire extinguishers, fire blankets and other firefighting equipment, to support the response where a threat from FAAS has been identified. The decisions made should be supported by the Fire Risk Assessor and be recorded in the premises fire risk assessment.
The following are amongst a wide range of factors that should be considered:
- Foam and water-based extinguishers work well against a wide variety of fires.
- Foam, dry powder or CO2 extinguishers are considered most suitable for use against flammable liquids such as petrol (type B fires).
- The use of dry powder in confined spaces should be avoided as they may create breathing problems and so should only be used inside if there is no alternative.
- A CO2 extinguisher will not be effective if there is free flowing liquid.
- The use of a water-based extinguisher on a liquid fire may cause the fire to spread, as the fuel will float on the water.
- For each scenario, consideration should be given to the type and proximity of firefighting media in relation to the risk. Ensure the right type of extinguisher is available to deal with the anticipated fire.
Further guidance may be obtained from a competent fire safety professional or local fire and rescue service.
Step 6: Review
Is there a plan in place to ensure that:
- All the mitigations work effectively?
- Staff have had the necessary training and briefing?
- All measures are regularly practiced and exercised?
- The risk of a FAAS attack is regularly reviewed?
The review activities are divided into three clear areas. These are:
- Making certain that all the necessary planning tasks have been completed
- Undertaking regular readiness checks
- Undertaking a regular review of the risk of FAAS.
Completing the Tasks
A considerable number of tasks have been identified that a site should consider as they are deciding what additional measures they should take to protect their site from FAAS.
Readiness Checks
Checklists should already be in place to confirm that elements of the security and fire safety planning remain in place and are effectively implemented.
Review the Risk
As with every security risk, a regular review should take place to determine that the likely threat scenarios remain the same and that the risk of them being manifested remains the same. This should be undertaken at regular intervals as well as in response to any use of FAAS as an attack methodology (both nationally and internationally) against organisations of a similar profile.