Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED)
An improvised explosive device is either visible or concealed within a vehicle and transported to target.
The effects from a VBIED detonation include the blast, fireball, primary & secondary fragmentation and ground shock.
The blast stand-off (the distance between the device and the asset) is the most important factor in determining the extent of damage that can be caused. Maximising the blast stand-off distance will reduce the damage sustained to the asset.
Vehicle As a Weapon (VAW)
Deliberately driving a vehicle:
- at an individual or into crowds of people to cause harm; or
- deliberately driving a vehicle into infrastructure to damage or disrupt its operation. This may indirectly lead to harm to people or disruption to the operation of a site/event, or more widely, critical services or supplies.
Driving a vehicle into crowds is regarded by terrorists as attractive because it is likely to cause multiple casualties, is low complexity, affordable, requires little planning and skill and is perceived as less likely to be detected in the planning phase.
VAW attacks are frequently the first part of a Layered Attack. The attacks frequently begin on public roads with little or no warning and are often followed by a marauding attack using bladed weapons, firearms or fire as a weapon.
Layered Attack Vehicle - transporting attackers and / or weapons
A layered attack is a combination of attack types.
The vehicle may:
- facilitate the delivery of armed attackers, either covertly or overtly; or
- be combined with a VBIED or VAW attack
There are seven exploits terrorists will use to overcome operational and/or physical security measures
NPSA recommends a full range of potential threat vehicles and attack methodologies (including a range of impact speeds) are considered when developing HVM Operational Requirements
This scoping document can be used by customers seeking proposals from potential Vehicle Security Barrier (VSB) suppliers
Guidance on aspects of sourcing, procuring, tasking and retaining specialist security consultants
Guidance for security professionals and specifiers of Vehicle Security Barriers (VSBs), to provide clarity and answer recurring queries that circulate across the industry
Document highlights the main differences between vehicle security barriers and road safety barriers
Impact rated vehicle security barriers that have been tested to publicly available vehicle impact test standards
NPSA VADS rated Vehicle Security Barriers against aggressive and repetitive vehicle impacts.
Guidance note on the design and vehicle impact performance of ditches, bunds & trees
HVM guidance note on the differences between and the most appropriate use of vehicle impact testing and computational analysis (Finite Element Analysis)
PAS 29000:2021, sponsored by DfT and NPSA , has been developed to mitigate the risk of malicious use of commercial vehicles. It sets out a raft of security measures for operators, to prevent criminals and terrorists from accessing commercial vehicles. It compliments Government best practice guidance for goods vehicle operators and drivers.
When installing VSBs with concrete foundations, in addition to considering the specification of the concrete, the curing environment must also be considered
Summary guidance note provides advice and considerations on determining the soil conditions when testing VSBs installed in soil
Full report on advice and considerations on determining the soil conditions when testing VSBs installed in soil
Provides clarity and answers to recurring queries that circulate across the industry
Document highlights to security managers and specifiers the design terminology and considerations when installing Vehicle Security Barriers (VSBs)
Document focuses on the design aspects of VSB controls; it does NOT include guidance on management or training
The design of a Vehicle Access Control Point (VACP) should be based on the Operational Requirements (OR) provided by the site owner or operator
When installing VSBs with concrete foundations, in addition to considering the specification of the concrete, the curing environment must also be considered
This publication provides information and stimulus to those responsible for integrating hostile vehicle mitigation into the public realm
This guidance document describes 6 HVM scheme designs that Local & Highway Authorities, public realm designers, developers and security consultants should consider when considering options to protect streets from vehicle borne threats, including Vehicle As a Weapon Attack.
These documents provide advice on increasing the protection of crowded places from a terrorist attack
How bollard schemes affect pedestrians, and planning advice to help with installing bollards to reduce vehicle threats
Reasons for and information on how to use vehicle security barriers (VSB) within a streetscape
Additional guidance on using bollards as a vehicle security barrier
Mitigating the risk to high streets
The risk to pedestrians from Vehicle As a Weapon (VAW) attack remains a real possibility during the COVID-19 pandemic. Social distancing measures will require authorities and businesses to guide customers in and around commercial premises and publicly accessible locations e.g. high streets. In order to minimise the risks to people, organisations and authorities can take practical steps to reduce the risk.
Guidance intended for authorities who are considering temporarily increasing or expanding pedestrianised spaces to assist businesses with COVID-19 social distancing measures and the revitalisation of high streets. For additional information, please read this blog.
Advice note outlines the VAW threat and provides guiding and technical principles on how to reduce the risk to queuing people
Are you a vehicle security barrier or street furniture manufacturer/designer? NPSA wants to work with you...
Anti-Terrorism Traffic Regulation Order
An ATTRO provides a statutory basis under the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 (RTRA) for regulating traffic and implementing physical security measures to:
- avoid or reduce, or reduce the likelihood of, danger connected with terrorism; and
- prevent or reduce damage connected with terrorism, where terrorism is as defined in the Terrorism Act 2000.
ATTROs may be permanent or temporary and can only be made by a traffic authority on the recommendation of a Chief Officer of Police.
ATTROs can:
- provide for the installation of permanent vehicle control measures;
- provide for the installation of temporary vehicle control measures;
- provide for the installation of permanent vehicle control measures for later use, for example at times of raised threat or for specific events. These measures may include, for example, the installation of rising security bollards around a city centre used only when a secure conference was being hosted, i.e. whilst the bollard installation is permanent, its use is temporary;
- enable the commencement, suspension or resumption of provisions. The provisions also allow for the discretion of a Constable to apply, or not to apply, a provision of an ATTRO;
- prohibit parking on a road, for example near a vulnerable site;
- restrict pedestrian access to premises in roads affected.
Vulnerability of rising arm and swing arm barriers
Some rising arm and swing arm Vehicle Security Barriers (VSBs) are vulnerable to impact from smaller cars even though they may be able to stop a larger vehicles travelling at speed.
NPSA recommends that rising & swing arm VSBs deployed to protect assets against vehicle borne threats should be tested and rated to the following standards and include an M1 classification vehicle i.e. passenger car:
- ISO IWA 14-1:2013; and where necessary
- NPSAs Vehicle Attack Delay Standard (VADS), possibly also with an N1G (4x4) vehicle;
In recent years, vehicle borne threats have evolved to include Vehicle as a Weapon (VAW) attacks, with perpetrators using a wide range of vehicles from passenger cars up to lorries. A number of security related incidents and terrorist attacks have involved or used hatchback and saloon cars to target people or attempt to breach perimeters. Their use remains a realistic possibility.
Consequently, following a programme of research and full scale vehicle impact testing, NPSA recommends a full range of potential threat vehicles and attack methodologies (including a range of impact speeds) are considered when developing HVM Operational Requirements. Assurance should be sought during the tender procurement process that the proposed VSB attained the necessary vehicle impact performance rating/s against your identified vehicle borne threats.
For rising arm and swing arm VSBs already in place, discuss your requirements with the original equipment manufacturer. HVM specialist members of the Register of Security Engineers and Specialists will also be able advise you of specific design features that may need addressing.
Engineered design modifications to barriers should not be implemented without first validating the performance through vehicle impact testing as detailed above.
Additional advice may be sought from:
- Original vehicle security barrier manufacturers
- HVM Specialist Members of the Register of Security Engineers and Specialists
- NPSA Security Advisers
- UK Government Protective Security Advisers
- Police Counter Terrorism Security Advisers (CTSA)
Assurance should be sought during the tender procurement process that the proposed VSB attained the necessary vehicle impact performance rating/s against your identified vehicle borne threats
NPSA recommends a full range of potential threat vehicles and attack methodologies (including a range of impact speeds) are considered when developing HVM Operational Requirements